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STANDING OF CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS TO
CHALLENGE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION IN FEDERAL COURT
Recent years have produced a growing concern among the Ameri-
can public regarding the importance of the sound utilization of our
natural resources and the potential impact modern technology may
have upon our environment. Congress responded to this concern by
enacting the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA);
which declares that national policy must seek to effect a productive
harmony between man and his environment.° Title I of the NEPA is
directed primarily toward federal administrative agencies, and requires
that they review their current policies and regulations to insure that all
federal agencies act in conformity with the policies and purposes of the
NEPA.8
In the past, conservation organizations often attempted to chal-
lenge federal administrative action allegedly detrimental to natural
resources.' At the outset, such organizations were confronted with the
contention that they lacked standing to sue in federal court to challenge
such governmental action on behalf of the general public interest in
natural resources. Since judicial review serves an important function
in protecting the public against allegedly illegal administrative action,°
denial of standing to such groups may effectively curtail the possibility
of judicial review altogether.° This comment will explore the concept
of standing as applicable to suits by conservation organizations to pro-
tect the public interest in the nation's natural resources and environ-
ment. The discussion will initially focus upon the principles of standing
prior to two recent Supreme Court decisions,7 and then upon the appli-
cation of those principles by lower courts in suits by conservation
groups. Finally, the comment will analyze the two recent Supreme
Court decisions and assess their probable impact.
1 42 U.S.C.A. { 4321 et seq.
2 Id. §§ 4321, 4333.
Id. { 4333.
4 See cases discussed infra at pp. 641-47.
3 L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 459 (Abr, student ed. 1965).
See South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir, 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970), in which the court denied standing to local organi-
zations which desired to preserve local historic sites. The importance of finding standing
in such organizations is illustrated in Parker v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 685 (D. Colo.
1964),• where the court held that a conservation organization had standing to have a
national park declared a national wilderness. If the court had denied standing, the
timber on the parklands would have been destroyed, even though the Department of the
Interior may have been obligated to designate the area as a national wilderness. This
case is discussed in Keck, Standing to Sue--and Public Timber Resources, 3 Natural
Resources Lawyer 444 (1970).
7
 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). These cases are discussed Infra at
pp. 647-50.
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I. THE CONCEPT OF STANDING
Standing to sue in federal court has been characterized by the
Supreme Court as a "complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction," 8
has befuddled other courts as "one of the most amorphous concepts in
the domain of public law,"° and has been criticized by commentators
for an artificiality and a complexity that often results in the Supreme
Court violating its own standing principles." The nub of the problem
lies in the Supreme Court's determination that standing is related to
the Article III limitation that federal courts decide only "cases and
controversies."11
 In terms of this limitation, standing focuses upon
whether the party seeking relief has alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the litigation that the issue will be presented in an
adversary context and in a form capable of judicial resolution."
Since most standing decisions have been directed at solving the
problems of individual situations" rather than providing future guid-
ance," even the Supreme Court has admitted that generalizations about
standing are worthless." However, despite the difficulty of applying
such rules, a litigant was said to possess standing if he could show injury
to a legal right, that he was a party aggrieved, or that he was a proper
party to act as a private attorney general.
The legal right theory finds its strongest application in cases such
as Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA," in which an electric power
company sued to restrain the TVA from generating power in competi-
tion with it. Although recognizing the principle that one threatened
with direct or special injury by government action may challenge the
validity of such action, 17 the Court concluded that such principle is
inapplicable
unless the right invaded is a legal right—one of property, one
arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion
or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege."
Since no person has a right to be free from lawful competition," the
plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the action of the TVA.
The TVA decision graphically illustrates the result of applying the
"legal right" test. Although the plaintiff alleged that he would suffer
8 United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
10 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 22.01 at 210 (1950.
11
 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-98 (1968).
12 Id. at '101; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
18 United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
14 Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
15
 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151
(1970).
18 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
17
 Id. at 137.
18 Id. at 137-38.
19 Id. at 140.
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severe economic injury as a result of the government's competition,
plaintiff was denied standing to challenge the lawfulness of that action."
The test has been criticized by commentators, and other decisions have
raised doubts as to its validity." The harsh results of its application
were mitigated by the subsequent formulation of the "party aggrieved"
or "legal interest" test.
This test is most clearly elucidated in FCC v. Sanders Brothers
Radio Station,22
 in which the plaintiff challenged the issuance of a
license to a competitor, thereby effectively increasing plaintiff's com-
petition. The plaintiff alleged that Section 402 (b) of the Federal Com-
munications Act, which provides that judicial review may be sought
"by any other person who is aggrieved or whose interests are adversely
affected by any decision of the Commission, ..." 22 accorded him stand-
ing. The Court reviewed the legislative history and policy of the Federal
Communications Act and concluded that the Act was intended to protect
the public and that it did not create anything in the nature of a property
right in the holder of a license.' The Court indicated, however, that
Congress had some purpose in enacting section 402 (b) (2), and that if
Congress believed that only a person financially injured possessed a
sufficient interest to prosecute an appeal, "it is within the power of
Congress to confer such standing.' The Court thus concluded that
the plaintiff bad standing to seek judicial review of the Commission's
order.
The significance of the Sanders doctrine is that the litigant has
standing not because of any legal right, but rather because the interest
he asserts is an interest protected by the statute. The private attorney
general concept is an extension of the Sanders doctrine in that it allows
standing to protect public as well as private interests.
The private attorney general concept finds its clearest enunciation
in two cases. In Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,2° plaintiff chal-
lenged the issuance of a license to a radio station in another city. Since
the new license changed the other station's frequency to the same as
that of plaintiff, plaintiff alleged that it would be subject to a loss of
listening audience and that a substantial portion of the listening public
in the area would be deprived of its only radio service." Although recog-
nizing that the Federal Communications Act did not create new rights,"
the Court concluded that these private litigants have standing only to
protect the public interest, and even though
20 Id. at 147, 152 (Butler, J., dissenting).
21 3 K. Davis, supra note 10, 22.04 at 217-18; Id. at 52-53 (Supp. 1965) and cases
cited therein.
22 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
23 47 U.S.C.	 402(b)(6) (1964).
24 309 U.S. at 475.
25 Id. at 477.
20 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
27
 Id. at 5.
28
 Id. at 14.
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a court is called upon to enforce public rights and not the
interests of private property [this] does not diminish its
power to protect such rights . . . because the rights to be
vindicated are those of the public and not of the private
litigants."
In Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes 8 0
 the
Second Circuit upheld the standing of consumers of coal to challenge
an order increasing the minimum price of coal. In an attempt to recon-
cile the Sanders and Scripps-Howard cases, the court concluded that
just as Congress can
constitutionally authorize one of its own officials, such as the
Attorney General, to bring a proceeding to prevent another
official from acting in violation of his statutory powers .. .
[so also] Congress can constitutionally enact a statute con-
ferring on any non-official person . . . authority to bring a
suit to prevent action by an officer in violation of his statutory
powers. . . . Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak,
private Attorney Generals. 8'
What is clear from both the Scripps-Howard and Ickes decisions
is that the plaintiff has standing to assert the public interest and not
merely an interest personal to himself. These cases have been cited by
lower courts to find standing for conservation groups to challenge
government action.82
All three tests have not been without criticism or difficulty of
application. The distinction between calling something a "legal right"
or a "legal interest" that an aggrieved party may assert has been
criticized as semantic, since if the litigant has a legally protected inter-
est he may assert in court, it is far more logical to call it a right and
avoid a confusion of terms." The private attorney general concept has
been subject to debate on the question of whether the plaintiff who
asserts the public interest must also be suffering some specific injury
to himself." The Supreme Court has not passed upon the issue directly
so that the scope of the private attorney general concept remains un-
clear." Notwithstanding the difficulty in articulating these tests, several
decisions have applied these standards to the conservation area.
23 Id. at 14-15.
so 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
81 134 F.2d at 704.
82 See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v, FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied sub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). This case is discussed infra at
pp. 641-42.
83 3 K. Davis, supra note 10, § 22.04 at 222.
84 See Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601, 614-16
(1968), for Professor Davis' criticism of Professor Jaffe's position; see Jaffe, supra note
5, at 498-500. See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
$5 See Davis, supra note 34, at 616.
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II. STANDING IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES
The most significant lower court decisions upholding standing for
conservation groups to sue to protect the public interest have been
decided in the Second Circuit. In Scenic Hudson Preservation Confer-
ence v. FPC," conservation organizations and three New York towns
petitioned the court to set aside an order of the Federal Power Commis-
sion granting a license to Consolidated Edison of New York. Pursuant
to the license, Consolidated Edison had been given permission to con-
struct a hydro-electric station on the west side of the Hudson River at
Storm King Mountain near Cornwall, New York." Petitioners alleged
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 313 (b) of the Federal Power Act
which provides:
Any party ... aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission
. . . may obtain a review of such order in the United States
court of appeals. . 88
Petitioners alleged that the existence of the power station would ad-
versely affect the conservation and natural beauty of the area, and
further, that the FPC had failed to consider the conservational aspects
of power development as required by Section 10(a) of the Federal
Power Act."
Although that section did not require the FPC to consider con-
servational aspects, the court concluded that the phrase "for recrea-
tional purposes" in section 10(a) "encompassed the conservation of
natural resources, the maintenance of natural beauty and the preser-
vation of historic sites!'" Having found the legally protected interest,
the court then addressed itself to the question of standing. Since a
statute may create new interests or rights, and thus give standing to
one who is otherwise barred,41 the court concluded that in order to
protect the aesthetic, conservational and recreational aspects of power
development, those who
by their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest
in such areas, must be . . . "aggrieved" parties under § 313
(b). We hold that the Federal Power Act gives petitioners a
legal right to protect their special interests.'
What is significant in this decision is that although one plaintiff
alleged that his trailways would be flooded by the proposed power
88 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. of
New York, Inc. v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
37 354 F.2d at 611.
88 16 U.S.C. 0 8251 (b) (1964).
89 Id.	 803(a). This section, however, refers only to "recreational uses" and not
conservational values.
40 354 F.2d at 614.
41 Id. at 615.
42 Id. at 616.
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development," the court permitted this plaintiff to challenge not only
the feasibility of the plant, but also permitted plaintiff to compel con-
sideration of underground power lines and a device to protect the
fish in the Hudson River." The court failed to connect the injury
allegedly suffered by this plaintiff with the proposed relief. Quite ob-
viously, neither underground transmission lines nor a fish-protecting
device will protect trailways that will be flooded by the construction
of the plant. In effect, the court has given this plaintiff a remedy having
no connection to the injury he allegedly suffered. Although Scenic Hud-
son has been subject to criticism, its basic holding that conservational
values may be protected interests has been followed by other courts."
Scenic Hudson also illustrates the application of the private attorney
general concept and the "party aggrieved" statutes to confer standing
upon conservation organizations.
In Road Review League v. Boyd," the rationale of the Scenic
Hudson decision was expanded to include standing to sue under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 4 7 In Road Review, a New York
town, one civic organization, two wildlife sanctuaries, and certain
individuals sued to set aside a proposed highway route determination of
the Federal Highway Administrator as arbitrary, capricious and not in
accordance with law." Relying upon the judicial review provision of
the APA, the court concluded that Section 15(a) of the Federal High-
way Act, which sets forth a national policy of protecting the natural
beauty and historic sites along a proposed highway route," provided
a sufficient basis for the finding that conservation organizations are
"aggrieved" by agency action which has allegedly disregarded their
interests."
The , significance of Road Review lies in the court's application of
Section 10(a) of the APA. That section provides that
[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute is entitled to judicial review
thereof."
The exact meaning to be given this section has been the subject of
extended debate. Professor Davis has concluded that the APA grants
the right of judicial review to any person "adversely affected in fact"
43 Id.
44 Id. at 611.
45 For a criticism, see Davis, supra note 34, at 624 n. 72. For cases citing Scenic
Hudson, see Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) discussed
infra at pp. 642-43, and Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097
n. 15 (D.C. Cir. 1970), discussed infra at pp. 651-52.
46 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
47 5 U.S.C.	 702 (Supp. II, 1967).
45 270 F. Supp. at 651.
40 23 U.S.C. { 138 (Supp. III, 1968).
55 270 F. Supp. at 660-61.
al 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. II, 1967).
642
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON STANDING FOR CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS
by agency action." Professor Jaffe, on the other hand, has argued that
Professor Davis is wrong, and that the APA was meant to reflect
existing law at the time of its enactment." Professor Jaffe concludes,
therefore, that, as was done in Sanders, emphasis should be placed
upon the relevant statute to determine if there is a legally protected
interest. The legislative history is confusing, but courts have generally
taken the Jaffe approach of placing greater emphasis upon the relevant
statute and the interest asserted by the plaintiff." Although the Su-
preme Court has not resolved the issue, it has stated that the judicial
review provisions of the APA should be broadly construed, and judicial
review should not be denied unless Congress has explicitly made clear
such an intent."
Whatever the outcome of the debate, by reasoning that the APA
should be interpreted in a manner similar to the "person aggrieved"
provision that was utilized in Scenic Hudson," the Road Review ra-
tionale provides a basis for standing in any situation in which the
plaintiff alleges that the interest he asserts was intended to be protected
by Congress. As such, the Road Review rationale supports a finding of
standing based upon broad policy declarations."
An even more recent case in the Second Circuit that has applied
the principles of both Scenic Hudson and Road Review is Citizens Com-
mittee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe." In Volpe, the Sierra Club and
others sought to set aside a permit issued by the Corps of Engineers that
would have permitted the State of New York to dredge and fill a por-
tion of the Hudson River for construction of a proposed highway."
Petitioners asserted jurisdiction under the APA, and alleged that the
Corps of Engineers had violated Section 9 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act,°° and Section 6(g) of the Department of Transportation Act" in
issuing the permits. The district court had interpreted these two pro-
visions as requiring the Corps of Engineers to obtain approval from the
Secretary of Transportation where construction of a bridge, causeway
or dike is contemplated.02 The district court found that a fill was a
52 3 K. Davis, supra note 10, § 22.02 at 211-12.
48 Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 255,
288 (1961).
54 See Comment, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 180 n. 20 (1970) and cases therein cited.
35 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
56 270 F. Supp. at 660-61.
5T See Norwalk Congress of Racial Equality v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency,
395 F.2d 920, 934 (2d Cir. 1968) in which the court upheld the standing of a local
community organization to sue to compel the defendant to provide adequate housing
for persons displaced from an urban renewal project since the court believed that
Congress intended to protect displaced persons when it enacted the Federal Housing Act.
" 8 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
50 425 F.2d at 99-100.
60
 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1964).
01 49 U.S.C. § 1655 (g) (Supp. IV, 1969) which transferred jurisdiction over
bridges and causeways from the Department of the Army to the Department of Trans-
portation.
02
 302 F. Supp, 1083, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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dike," and that plaintiffs had, under the Scenic Hudson and Road
Review decisions, standing to commence this action."
On appeal, the court upheld the district court's interpretation of
the interrelationship between the Rivers and Harbors Act and the
Department of Transportation Act," and, therefore, the Corps was
in violation of the statute." Although recognizing that the plaintiffs
had made no claim that the government action threatened them with
direct or personal harm," the court concluded that the petitioners
had standing to assert the public interest in natural resources
as private attorney generals . . . and therefore we hold that
the public interest in natural resources—an interest created
by statutes affecting the issuance of this permit—is a legally
protected interest, affording these plaintiffs, as responsible
representatives of the public, standing to obtain judicial
review of agency action alleged to be in contravention of
that interest."
The significance of this decision rests in the fact that the court
granted standing despite its finding that the conservation groups were
not suffering any personal harm or injury. Although the court's opinion
cites Ickes, Sanders, and Scripps-Howard," in those cases the individual
plaintiffs themselves were suffering a particular harm.7° The court's
opinion, therefore, is an application of the public action doctrine that
has been espoused by Professor Jaffe.71 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari to review the Volpe decision,72 thereby avoiding the issue of
whether such suits are permissible. The need for resolution of this issue
is demonstrated by a recent decision in the Ninth Circuit that has
denied standing to such groups.
III. SIERRA CLUB V. HICKEL
In Sierra Club v. Hickel," the Sierra Club sought a declaratory
judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctions that would have
enjoiried the Secretaries of Agriculture and the interior from issuing
03 Id. at 1088-089,
64 Id. at 1093.
06 425 F.2d at 100 n.l.
66 Id. at 106.
67 Id. at 102.
88 Id. at 105.
09 Id. at 102.
70 See discussion of Sanders supra at p. 539; Scripps-Howard supra at pp. 639-40;
Ickes supra at p. 640.
71 L. Ji.ffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 459 (Abr. student ed. 1965).
Under the "public action" concept, a citizen would have standing to obtain judicial
review of allegedly illegal administrative action although he Is not suffering any injury
distinct from the general public.
72
 400 U.S. 949 (1M).
73 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted sub nom. Sierra Club v. Morton, 39
U.S.L.W. 3359 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971).
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permits to Walt Disney Productions. Pursuant to the permits, Disney
had been given permission for the development of a year-round recrea-
tional facility in the Mineral King Valley of the Sequoia National Park
of California. To facilitate automobile access to the proposed park
development, the Disney plan requires the construction of a new high-
way that would partially cross both the Sequoia National Park and
Sequoia National Forest." The Sierra Club contended that the Secre-
tary of Agriculture had exceeded his statutory authority and had acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the Disney plan. 78 The Sierra
Club further contended that the Secretary of the Interior had also
acted illegally in issuing a permit for construction of the highway
across the Sequoia National Park." Lastly, the Sierra Club asserted
that no authority exists in the Secretary of Agriculture to issue a per-
mit that would permit construction of transmission lines across national
park lands."
The district court issued a temporary injunction forbidding the
United States from proceeding with the Disney plan. 78 In issuing the
injunction, the district court relied upon the Scenic Hudson decision
to hold that the Sierra Club had standing to sue to protect the public
interest in natural resources. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that neither the Sierra Club nor any
of its members possessed a sufficient interest in the outcome of the
litigation for standing to be conferred." The court relied in its decision
upon the concept of standing enunciated in Ickes that
a federal] court has no jurisdiction, unless the citizen shows
that such conduct or threatened conduct invades or will invade
a private substantive legally protected interest of the plain-
tiff citizen; such invaded interests must be either of "recog-
nized" character, at "common law" or a substantive private
legally protected interest created by statute. 8°
Applying these principles to the instant case, the court noted that the
Sierra Club had not asserted that any of its property or its organiza-
tional status would be endangered by the challenged governmental
action.81 The court found, on the contrary, that the only interest al-
leged to have been invaded was the Club's interest in the conservation
and maintenance of the national parks and forests." The court con-
cluded, therefore, that no adversary position existed between the




78 Unreported. See, O.S. Gray, Cases and Materials on Environmental Law 35
(1970) for the full opinion of the district court.
79 433 17.2d at 33.
80 Id. at 28, quoting Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1943).
81 Id. at 30.
82 Id. at 29.
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Sierra Club and the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior." Con-
sequently, although the Sierra Club does possess an interest insofar
as the proposed course of action is displeasing to its members," the
court did not believe that
such club concern without a showing of more direct interest
can constitute standing in the legal sense sufficient to challenge
the exercise of responsibilities on behalf of all the citizens by
two cabinet level officials of the government acting under a
Congressional and constitutional mandate."
The majority did not believe that the recent Supreme Court decision
in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp" pro-
vided a basis for standing because in that case plaintiff was threatened
with direct economic injury as a result of a loss of profits." Standing
derived, therefore, from the existence of a direct injury in fact to the
plaintiff." The court rejected any reliance upon Scenic Hudson since
the court believed that there the "party aggrieved" provisions of the
Federal Power Act provided the basis for standing, whereas in the
present case no such provisions existed." The court distinguished Road
Review since there the conservation organizations had been joined by
persons who would be displaced by the proposed road. 9° The court also
rejected Volpe and Parker v. United States" because in those cases
residents and users of the area had joined the Sierra Club as plaintiffs,
and those individuals possessed the direct and obvious interest neces-
sary to confer standing." To the extent that Volpe granted standing
within the private attorney general concept, the Sierra Club court dis-
agreed since it believed that concept is limited only to those cases in
which Congress had specifically enacted a statute conferring standing
upon any non-official person to prevent unauthorized official action."
Lastly, the court concluded that the APA did not provide a basis for
standing since the plaintiff was neither suffering a legal wrong nor was
"adversely affected or aggrieved" within the meaning of the relevant
statute."
One member of the court dissented from the court's treatment of
the question of standing. He believed that the Supreme Court's decision
in Data Processing supported the principle that the element of legal
83 Id.
84 Id. at 33.
85 Id. at 30.
80 397 U.S. 130 (1970).
87 433 F2d at 31.
88 Id.
89
 Id. at 30.
9° Id.
91 307 F. Supp. 685 (D. Cola. 1969), where the court upheld the standing of , a
conservation organization to have a national park declared a national wilderness.
92 433 F.2d at 33.
BEI Id. at 33 n.9.
94 Id. at 32.
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wrong necessary to confer standing need not be of an economic char-
acter, but may also be aesthetic, conservational or recreational in
nature." Since the Sierra Club represents thousands of persons who
have a deep interest in such matters, he concluded that if the relevant
statutes or regulations are being invaded, the Sierra Club has standing
to assert that a legal wrong is being inflicted upon it."
The different approaches taken by the courts in Volpe and Sierra
Club illustrate the uncertainty and confusion in the area of standing.
In its opinion, the Sierra Club court distinguished the Volpe decision
from the case before it on the basis that in Volpe the Sierra Club had
been joined by local conservation organizations made up of local resi-
dents and users of the area who had the requisite direct and obvious
interest in the administrative action." Further, the Sierra Club court
argued that the Volpe decision did not fall within the private attorney
general theory because that concept is limited to cases where Congress
has specifically enacted a statute conferring standing." Since no such
statute existed in Sierra Club, the court reasoned that the private
attorney general concept was inapplicable."
It is submitted that Sierra Club's analysis of the Volpe decision is
analytically faulty. The essence of the court's analysis is that the pres-
ence of a right in the local residents or users of an area inures to the
conservation groups who then have standing. Hohfeldian analysis re-
veals the illogic of such an argument since the presence or absence of
a right in one person does not imply the presence or absence of that
right in another. 10° Furthermore the court's reliance upon injury in
fact as applied to users, a class that includes the whole world, can be
applied to find standing not only for the frequent user of an area, but
for the once-a-year visitor as well. To the extent that the court believes
that users will present an adversary position, it is quite clear that the
dissenter is correct in his assertion that the Sierra Club had standing
since the Club and its thousands of members will most certainly pro-
vide an adverse plaintiff. However, the correctness of the court's con-
clusion cannot be determined without consideration of the significance
of the two recent Supreme Court decisions.
IV. THE Data Processing AND Barlow DECISIONS
In Association of Data Processing Services Organizations v. Camp,
an association which supplied data processing services to businesses
generally, challenged a ruling of the Comptroller of Currency that
permitted national banks to make data processing services available to
95 Id. at 38.
90 Id.
97 Id. at 33.
98 Id. at 33 n.9.
00 Id.
100 See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied In Judidal Reasoning,
23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913) and 26 Yale L,J. 710 (1917) for the basis of Hohfeld's philosophy.
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other banks and bank customers."' The district court dismissed the
complaint for lack of standing' and the court of appeals affirmed.'°s
In Barlow v. Collins,w4 tenant farmers eligible for payments un-
der the Upland Cotton Program of the Food and Agriculture Act of
1965,1" challenged the validity of an amended regulation issued by the
Secretary of Agriculture.'" Under the prior regulation, the tenant
farmers were not permitted to make assignments of the payments they
would receive under the program in order to secure the payment in
whole or in part of the cash rent for a farm.'" Under the amended
regulation, the tenant farmers were permitted to make such assign-
ments.108 As a result of the amended regulation, landlords demanded
that the tenants assign all their benefits as a condition to obtaining
their lease to work the land.'" Consequently, the tenants were required
to purchase all of their farm needs from the landlords, who in turn
charged exorbitant prices thereby consuming all of the tenants' profits
in debt payments to the landlord."° The district court dismissed the
complaint for lack of standing since it found that the government
action had not invaded any legally protected interest of the plaintiff."'
In affirming, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found not only
that the tenants had no legally protected interest, but also that there
was no provision "which expressly or implicitly gives petitioners stand-
ing to challenge this administrative action."'" The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review both the Data Processing' and Barlow'
decisions. In two opinions written by Justice Douglas, the Court va-
cated the judgments, and remanded both cases for a trial on the
merits.m
In Data Processing, the Court first discussed the question of
standing in terms of the Article III limitation on federal court juris-
diction to "cases and controversies." Reiterating the criteria enunci-
ated in Flast v. Cohen," the Court concluded that
the question of standing is related only to whether the dis-
101 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
102 279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1968).
108 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969).
104 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
106 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d) (Supp. IV, 1969).
106 397 U.S. at 160.
107 20 Fed. Reg. 6512 (1955). Under 16 U.S.C. 9 590h (g) (1964) tenant farmers
were permitted to make assignments of the payments they would receive to finance
"making a crop." By narrowly limiting the definition of "making a crop," the farmers
were excluded from assigning their payments to secure their farm rent.
108 7 C.F.R. § 709. 3(b) (1970).
152 397 U.S. at 163.
no Id.
111 Unreported.
112 398 F.2d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 1968).
113 395 U.S. 976 (1969).
114
 Id. at 958.
115 397 U.S. 150, 159.
116 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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pute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an advers-
ary context and in a form historically capable of judicial
resolution."'
The Court then set forth two criteria by which it can be determined
whether a litigant has standing to obtain judicial review: first, the
litigant must allege that the challenged action will cause him injury
in fact, economic or otherwise; "a second, the interest asserted by the
litigant must be arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 9
In announcing the second criteria, the Court specifically rejected the
legal interest test because of the Court's belief that such a test goes
to the merits and not to the question of standing.'"
In applying these two tests to the facts of Data Processing, the
Court found that petitioners had satisfied the first test of injury in fact
since they would suffer economic harm if the Comptroller's ruling were
valid.'" In applying the second test, the Court referred to Section 4 of
the Bank Service Corporation Act which provides that "[n]o bank
service corporation may engage in any activity other than the per-
formance of bank services for banks."'" The Court then proceeded
to quote from a case in which the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit held that section 4 precluded banks from engaging in non-banking
activities.'" The Court concluded that although it did not wish to
"implicate the merits" at that stage, section 4 "arguably brings a
competitor within the zone of interests protected by it." 124
In applying these criteria to the Barlow case, the Court found
that the farmers had a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the
litigation to satisfy the Article HI requirement of adversity."' How-
ever, the significance of the Barlow decision lies in the Court's deter-
mination that the interest asserted by the farmers was "clearly within
the zone of protected interests."'" In so holding, the Court referred to
three statutory provisions, only one of which had anything to do with
the assignment of payments by tenant farmers."' With respect to that
statute, the Court concluded that the fact that assignments were per-
mitted at all indicated a congressional concern for the tenant farmers'
117 397 U.S. at 151-52.
112 Id. at 152.
112 Id. at 15.3.
120
121 Id. at 152.
122 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1964).
123 397 U.S. at 155.
124 Id. at 156.
120 Id. at 161.
122 Id.
127 The statutes referred to were: 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d) (10) and (13) (Supp. IV,
1969), and 16 U.S.C. 4 590h(b) (1964), Only 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d)(13), by reference to
16 U.S.C. § 590h(g) (Supp. IV, 1969) has any relation to the right of tenant farmers
to assign the payments they receive under the program.
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welfare."' However, the Court never addressed itself to the specific
question presented by the plaintiffs—whether the tenant farmers had
a right to be free from the superior bargaining power of the landlords
by means of a renewed restriction on their ability to make assignment
of the payments due them under the statute. 12" The Barlow decision has
been subject to criticism because congressional concern for tenant farm-
ers' welfare cannot imply the right of one farmer to sue to challenge an
overpayment to another."' Such an application of the "zone of inter-
ests" test would render it nonsensical.'" Consequently, the Barlow
decision leaves unclear the precise significance of this "zone of inter-
ests" test.
This uncertainty was criticized by the dissent which maintained
that the only requirement for standing is injury in fact."' However,
the dissent's formulation of the question of reviewability—whether
Congress intended to deny judicial review of agency action at the in-
stance of this plaintiff—also requires a consideration of the relevant
statute to determine if the plaintiff is within the class of protected
persons.' The dissent, however, does illuminate the difficulties in-
herent in the Court's formulation of the requisites for standing.
V. IMPACT OF Data Processing AND Barlow UPON THE
CONSERVATION AREA
Since the Data Processing and Barlow decisions specifically re-
jected the legal interest test,184 a court is no longer required to find
that the statute intended to protect environmental values, but need
only find that such values are "arguably within the zone of interests"
protected or regulated by the statute. This avoids the initial considera-
tions confronted by the courts in Scenic Hudson, Road Review, and
Volpe. Thus, it would seem logical that conservation and anti-pollution
suits have been enhanced by the Data Processing and Barlow decisions.
The vagueness of the test laid down by the Court, however, makes it
doubtful that conservation organizations have been aided by these
decisions.
As stated, the essence of the Court's test is that the plaintiff must
allege that the challenged government action has caused him or will
cause him injury in fact to an interest arguably within the "zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by statute or constitutional guar-
antee in question." Although the Court wrote a paragraph to emphasize
that standing may stem from injury to non-economic interests, including
128 397 U.S. at 165 n.7.
122 See both the majority and dissenting opinions, 398 F.2d 398, 402-03 (5th Cir.
1968).
130 See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450, 456 (1970).
181 Id.
192 397 U.S. at 168 (Brennan & White, JJ., dissenting).
138 Id. at 173-74.
184 397 U.S. at 153.
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injury to "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational" values,'" recent
decisions interpreting the Court's standing test indicate that the lower
courts are uncertain as to the exact meaning of the "injury in fact-zone
of interests test."
In Sierra Club, although the court acknowledged that the signifi-
cance of the zone of interests test was unclear, the court proceeded to
conclude that the zone or interests test was not a test separate or in
addition to the injury in fact test.'" Since the court had previously
found that the challenged government action did not threaten the Club's
organizational status or property,'" the court denied standing since
there was no element of legal wrong being inflicted upon the plaintiff." 8
The court never considered whether the public interest in preserving the
national forest from private development was within the zone of pro-
tected interests. In effect, the court merely considered the injury in fact
test as applied to the conservation organization, and failed to give any
consideration to whether the public interest which plaintiff actually al-
leged was threatened with injury in fact.
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 18° however, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the standing of conser-
vation organizations to obtain judicial review of the Secretary of
Agriculture's failure to restrict the permissible uses of DDT as required
by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. 1" The
court believed that the statute in question reflected the congressional
concern for the interest of the public in safety, and, therefore, peti-
tioners had standing if they could show sufficient injury in fact to create
a case or controversy as required by the Constitution."' By analogizing
to cases where consumers had standing to protect the public interest in
the proper administration of a regulatory system enacted for their
benefit, the court concluded that petitioners had standing to protect the
public from the biological harm which would result to man and other
life because of the unrestricted use of DDT in the environment. 142
135 Id. at 154. The court specifically cited both the Scenic Hudson and Sanders
decisions in its discussion of non-economic interests that may be protected by statute.
136 433 F.2d at 31.
131 Id. at 30.
188 Id. at 32.
100 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
140 7 U.S.C.	 135 et seq. (1964).
141 428 F.2d at 1096.
142 Id. at 1096-097. The court cited the following consumer cases: Citizens for
Allegan County, Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Office of Communication
of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), and the decisions
in Ickes, Sanders, and Scripps-Howard. However, in both the Church of Christ and
Allegan County cases, petitioners had been denied the right to appear before the hearing
of the agency, and sought only judicial review of this denial of the right to a hearing
before the agency. Thus, the question was not whether the Iocal organizations had
standing to initiate judicial review of agency action, but whether they had standing to
appear before the administrative agency. See 359 F.2d at 997; 414 F.2d at 1127. The
Ickes, Scripps-Howard, and Sanders cases involved the question of standing to initiate
judicial review. The question of who is entitled to , administrative review is determined
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Therefore, the court concluded that members of the public were
"aggrieved persons" within the meaning of the relevant statute.'" In a
footnote, the court stated the belief that the "aggrieved persons" test
was equivalent to finding that the complainant's interest is within the
zone of protected interests.'"
The difficulty with such an analysis is that it avoids the issue faced
squarely in the Sierra Club case, that is, whether the plaintiff individu-
ally is in fact injured as opposed to his suffering injury as a member of
the general public. Obviously, many statutes enacted by Congress are
concerned with public safety and entrust supervisory duties to a federal
agency. Therefore, under the Environmental Defense Fund decision,
since consumers are a class coterminus with whole world, any member
of the public is suffering injury in fact if an administrative agency fails
to comply with its statutory mandate. As such, the court has effectively
permitted the "public action" suit espoused by Professor Jaffe in which
the citizen has standing to obtain judicial review of allegedly illegal
administrative action although not suffering an injury distinct from the
general public."' Although the Supreme Court avoided this issue by
denying certiorari in the Volpe decision, its recent grant of certiorari to
review Sierra Club v. Hickel suggests that the Court might finally come
to grips with this question.'"
The zone of interests test compels a court to consider difficult
questions of statutory interpretation, although the Supreme Court's
opinion in Flast v. Cohen indicated that the fundamental aspect of
standing focuses upon whether the party seeking relief will present the
dispute in an adversary context.'" When a suit challenges the legality
of administrative action, the zone of interests test does not present a
viable rule for a court to follow. If a court makes an initial determina-
tion that the interest asserted does not fall within the zone of interests,
then the court must deny standing to the plaintiff and never reach the
merits of the controversy. If ultimately, however, the decision is
reversed by either a court of appeals or the Supreme Court, the process
of adjudication must begin all over again. Thus, valuable judicial time
will be lost before the court ever reaches the merits of the contro-
versy.148
by reference to the legislative history of the statute and not to constitutional considera-
tions of standing. Such legislative scrutiny was performed by both the Church of Christ
court, 359 F.2d at 1000-006, and by the Allegan County court, 414 F.2d at 1128 n,4. See
3 K. Davis, Administrative Law 1 22.08, at 210 (1958).
148 428 F.2d at 1097.
144 428 F.2d at 1097 n.16.
146 L. Jaffe, Judidal Control of Administrative Action 459, 495-500 (Abr. student
ed. 1965). Professor Jaffe wishes to see further development of the concept that dtizens
can challenge administrative action in federal court although they are not suffering an
injury distinct from the public at large.
14e — U.S. — (1971).
147 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
148 See, e.g., the tortuous history of Arnold Tours v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st
Cir. 1969), vacated, 397 U.S. 1109 (1970). On remand, the First Circuit affirmed its
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It is suggested that since "adversity" is the essence of the Flast
holding, such adversity may be satisfied by applying a modified version
of the nexus requirement of Flast to the conservation area,'" thus
requiring the plaintiff to establish a logical link between himself and the
action he seeks to bring. Such a determination would be made by the
court's focusing on the party seeking relief to determine whether the
party will present the issues with the necessary adversity. Such a rule
directs judicial consideration at the initial stage of the litigation to the
proper issue—the adversary quality of the plaintiff and not the issues
he seeks to have adjudicated. 15° This approach was followed by the
court in lzaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair,'" where the
court upheld the standing of a conservation group to protect public
lands from private mineral exploitation. The court found standing
because it believed that the history of the conservation organization
indicated that it would clearly present the case in an adversary con-
text.'" The decision reflects the ease with which the adversary rule may
be applied, since in many cases a local organization will be a more ad-
verse plaintiff than a private individual.'"
CONCLUSION
Although the tests formulated by the Supreme Court in Data
Processing and Barlow may have a liberalizing effect upon the law of
standing, the inherent vagueness of the zone of interests test, and the
Court's unwillingness to face squarely the public action issue raised by
the Volpe decision, create doubts as to the exact impact these decisions
will have upon the standing of conservation groups to sue on behalf of
the public interest in natural resources. Recent decisions interpreting
the Data Processing and Barlow decisions have produced inconsistent
results. It has been suggested by one commentator that the issues of
reviewability and standing will be merged with the merits issue of
whether the plaintiff has a legal interest protected by the statute so that
previous decision, 428 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1970), only to have the Supreme Court, per
curiam, reverse and remand a second time, 400 U.S. 45 (1970). As in Data Processing,
this case challenged the validity of a ruling of the Comptroller of Currency that per-
mitted national banks to provide travel services. In remanding, the Court referred to its
decision in Data Processing and stated simply: "Nothing in the opinion limited 4 only
to competitors in the data processing field." 400 U.S. at 46. Now, after five deci-
sions, the merits of the controversy will finally be before the court.
140 Under Flare, a taxpayer had to show, first, a logical link between his status as
a taxpayer and the type of legislative enactment attacked, and second, a logical link
between his status as a taxpayer and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement
alleged. 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968).
150
 Id. at 99.
151
 313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970).
152 Id. at 1316,
ma The decision also reflects lower court confusion as to the precise meaning of
the injury in fact-zone of interests test. The court first concluded that the injury in fact
test was a non-constitutional requirement. Secondly, the court believed that the injury in
fact test was met because the interest asserted was arguably within the zone of interests.
See 313 F. Supp. at 1316-317.
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standing will be determined by finding the existence of the legal
interest and not by application of the Supreme Court's test.'" It has
also been suggested that the courts of appeals will merely restate their
previous positions so that the new standing test will have little effect in
changing the attitudes of the courts.'"
Although the zone of interests test is vague, the fact that a court no
longer must find the existence of a legal interest, but need only find that
the interest is arguably within the zone of interests, tends to suggest
that the net effect will be that courts will now find standing where pre-
viously they would not have.1" Consequently, in those cases in which
the statute requires the administrative agency to respect local interests
and conservation values, a greater likelihood of success exists if
the litigants include residents or users of the area sought to be pro-
tected. Quite obviously the interest they seek to protect is arguably
within the zone of protected interests.
Such a broad reading of statutes is consistent with recent Supreme
Court decisions that have stressed the principle that the class of persons
to be protected by statute is to be expanded,'" and statutory protec-
tion need not be explicit to confer standing. 1" The Court itself has
recently applied these two principles in its per curiam reversal of
Arnold Tours v. Camp,'" a case it had previously remanded in light of
Data Processine" only to have the First Circuit reinstate its original
decision.1"
This comment has suggested that the Court resolve the conflict
suggested by the opposite results reached in Sierra Club and Environ-
mental Defense Fund by pronouncing a rule that will rest the deter-
mination of standing squarely upon the discretionary powers of a dis-
trict court. Such a rule is judicially pragmatic in that it will avoid the
difficulty inherent in the zone of interests test: a court may dismiss a
suit for failure to assert an interest within the zone of interests, only to
have that decision subsequently reversed because an appellate court
154 See Pierson, Standing to Seek Judicial Review of Government Contract Awards:
Its Origins, Rationale and Effects on the Procurement Process, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.
Rev. 1, 23-24 (1970).
155 See Comment, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 183-84 (1970) and cases discussed therein.
155 See Harry H. Price & Sons, Inc. v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1970), in
which the court acknowledges that as a result of the Data Processing and Barlow de-
cisions it would now find standing in this case although prior to those decisions it would
not. Id. at 1140. One can sympathize with the court's reference to the zone of interests
test:
It might be suggested that there are principles of law set forth in decided cases
which are more easily understood and more readily applied than the above test
of standing.
425 F.2d. at 1140.
157 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. ISO,
154 (1970).
158
 Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 7 n. 7 (1968).
159
 400 U.S. 45 (1970). This case is discussed at note 148 supra.
150 397 U.S. 1109 (1970).
181
 428 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1970).
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concludes that the interest is within the zone of interests. With the
growing complexity of government, the adversary rule would facilitate
the judicial role, not only as a restraint on the unconstitutional use of
power, but also as a watchdog against illegal or excessive administrative
action.102
In summary, the effect of recent Supreme Court decisions has been
to end the need to find a legal right or a legally protected interest to
confer standing. Presently, a litigant need only show injury in fact to
an interest arguably within the zone of protected or regulated interests
for standing to exist. However, the inherent vagueness of that test
raises doubts as to the ease and consistency of its application. Recent
decisions tend to suggest that the standing of conservation organizations
to protect the public interest may ultimately depend upon the willing-
ness of lower courts to use judicial review liberally to supervise govern-
ment action .m
JOHN J. MAROTTA
102 See The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton):
There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that every act of
a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which
it is exercised, is void.
108 The importance of judicial receptivity to such suits is evidenced by two recent
decisions. In Alameda Conservation Ass'n. v. California, _ F.2d 	 (9th Cir. 1971), the
Ninth Circuit again denied standing to a conservation organization that had not alleged
injury to its property or other rights. In denying standing, the court stated that:
Standing is not established by suit initiated by this association simply because it
has as one of its purposes the protection of the "public interest" .. . Were it
otherwise the various clubs, political, economic and social now or yet to be
organized could wreck havoc with the administration of government, both fed-
eral and state. There are other forums where their voices and their views may be
effectively presented, but to have standing to submit a "case or controversy"
to a federal court, something more must be shown,
F.2d at —.
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
however, the District Court for the District of Columbia followed its Court of Appeals
decision in Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, and granted standing to conservation
organizations:
[who through] their research and other activities have actively sought to pre-
serve the natural environment . . . will suffer real injury if the anticipated en-
vironmental damage occurs.
39 U.S.L.W. 2429 (Feb. 2, 1971).
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